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THE VIOLATION OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE AS A CRIME
There are few comers of the law that have so consistently defied any
uniformity of analysis as that of the legal effects of violating a municipal
ordinance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently handed down a 'decision'
which certainly simplifies the issues, but which seems to require a close
examination of the premises used by the court.
A Wisconsin statute2 permitted any local authority to pass an ordi-
nance making it a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or both
to operate a vehicle upon any highway of the state while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. A limitation was imposed that such ordinance "must
be in strict conformity" with the similar statute of the state.
3
The county of Winnebago passed such an ordinance and McDonald was
charged with a violation of it. McDonald demanded a jury, and Judge
Schniege of the municipal court ordered it. Because no provision for a
jury trial was in the ordinance, Keefe, the county district attorney, petitioned
the circuit court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the
municipal court's order for a jury trial. The circuit court denied the peti-
tion. On appeal, the supreme court reversed this denial. Judge Fairchild
based his decision on the following chain of reasoning:
1. The power to define crimes is a sovereign power.
2. The legislature may not delegate such power to counties or munici-
palities.
3. The legislature may permit the counties and cities to collect fines
as penalties for the violation of local ordinances or it may permit
imprisonment to enforce the collection of a fine.
4. This power of collection is exercised through a civil action for
the recovery of a fine.
5. Imprisonment may not be imposed for a violation of a local ordi-
nance because
a. as an attempt to punish for a crime the ordinance is un-
authorized, and
b. by the constitution, there may be imprisonment only for a crime.
6. Therefore, this ordinance was invalid because the county inherently
cannot create crimes and the legislature cannot delegate to the county
its own power to create crimes.
The premises of this opinion offer the basis for entering upon a con-
sideration of the entire problem of the violation of a municipal ordinance.
1. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 28 N. W. 2d 345 (Wis. 1947).
2. Ws. STAT. § 85.84 (1945).
3. Wis. STAT. § 85.13 (1945). Punishment provided for violation in § 85.91 (3).
262
COMMENTS 263
It should be common knowledge that practically every local community
in the United States. sends people to jail for the violations of some of its
ordinances. The Wisconsin court would.put an end to this. If the decision
is correct, practically all states then face extensive alterations in the laws
governing their local communities. There will be much debate before such
steps are taken. It is submitted that such a fundamental overhauling of the
codes is not entirely necessary. This comment will undertake to show:
1. that the legislature can delegate its police power to-municipalities;
2. that violations of the police power can be criminal offenses, though
perhaps they should not be because they are not "true crimes" as
understood in criminal law;
3. that the prevailing view of a violation of the police power in the
form of a municipal ordinance being a civil action has created both
confusion and injustice and is in need of a re-analysis to reduce both;
4. that to determine whether a given municipal ordinance aims at punish-
ment or remedy is a better test of the procedure to be adopted than
the present fixed view that all such proceedings are civil regardless
of the consequences.
THE CONSTITTIrlONAL POWER
The first problem is that of delegation of power by the legislature.
A basic maxim of representative government is that the sovereign powers may
not be delegated. 4 "[B]ut fundamental as this maxim is, it is so qualified
by the customs of our race, and by other maxims which regard local govern-
ment, that the right of the legislature, in the entire absence of authorization
or prohibition, to create towns and other inferior municipal organizations,
and to confer upon them the powers of local government, and especially of
local taxation and police regulation usual with such corporations, would
always pass unchallenged. The legislature in these cases is not regarded as
delegating its authority, because the regulation of such local affairs as are
commonly left to local boards and officers is not understood to belong properly
to the state." 
5
While practically all decisions on the point agree with Judge Cooley
that this delegation of the sovereign power is an exception to the maxim,
6
4. 1 CooiLY, CO NSTIuTIrONAL LImITATIONs 224 (8th ed. 1927).
5. 1 COOLEY, op. cit., 389, 390. The general subject of delegation of legislative power
has been thoroughly covered with the general effect of destroying the absolutism of the
maxim, delegatus zon potest delegare. See Baesler, A Suggested Classification o the
Decisions on Delegation of Legislative Power, 15 B. U. L. REv. 507 (1935); Duff &
Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional
Law, 14 Come. L. Q. 168 (1929).
6. The authorities may well be classed as pre-Cooley and post-Cooley, for from
shortly after 1868 on, Cooley is the standard authority for this holding. The State v.
Simonds, 3 Mo. 414 (1834) ; The State v. Noyes, 30 N. H. 279 (1855) ; Bliss v. Kraus,
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there are- few. attempts at analysis. Tile suggestion has been niade 7-which
may explain the'reason advanced by Cooley-that devolution is a'more pre-
cise term'1han delegation. The function of the legislature is to allocate func-
tions of governifiit not exclusively legislative to the proper---on historical
and analytical "grotinds--depositaries. Since municipal corporations, both
historically -and analytically, should be the regulators of theii own political
life, the pbwer'devolves upon them. "By its very nature, a 'legislature is
a duty-assigning body." 8 When the"state legislature assigns the duty of
creating local by-laws to a municipality, it is not delegatifi"." aithority but
is actually distributing or devolving a proper function upon these local groups.
Whether the power to delegate agathority to a local unit 9 be an, exception
to the basicmaxim or is explainable 6n ther grounds, its universal exercise
must be recoghized.
As a preliminary, it should be understood that a municipal cprporation
is a creature of the state.10 It has only the powers given it by the s&t which
are specifically enumerated in its charter, This is a general view and in this
comment, space does not permit any consideration of the possible inherent
powers of local government."- The problem here being considered goes to
the very contention that whatever powers of self-regulation may be per-
mitted, no imposition of criminal sanctions can be delegated by the state
to its creatures.
What is the nature of this power delegated by the state legislatures to
the local counties and municipalities? This is the police power. Precise
definition has been elusive,12 but the general aims of this power are well
known: " [T] here seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the" protection
16 Ohio St. 55 (1864) ; Trigally v. Mayor and Aldermen of Memphis', 6 Cold. 382 (Tenn.
1869); Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491 (1869); State v. Westmoreland, 133 La. 1015,
63 So. 502 (1913); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141 (1889); Stanfill v. Court of
County Revenue, 80 Ala. 287 (1885) ; City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So.
769 (1914) ; Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N; E. 698 (1885).
7. Baesler, A Suggested Classification of the Decisions on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 15 B. U. L. Rv. 507, 509, 520 (1935) ; Walker, The Delegation 'of Police Power
to Counties, 3 LA. L. Rav. 522, 525-28 (1941).
8. Walker, op. cit., 525.
9* To counties: Walker, op. cit.. To cities: McBain, The Delegation of Legislative
Power to Cities, 32 POL. Sci. Q. 276, 391 (1917). See also, La Fargei Delegability of
Police Powers to Non-Municipal Public Corporations in Home Rule States, 5 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 880 (1937).
10. 1 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS § 145 (2d ed., 1940 Revision).
11. For an entry into the Home Rule debate, see McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent
Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COL. L. REv. 190 (1916).
12. "The term 'police power' has been much employed in recent years, and many
attempts have been made to define it, but it is said to be incapable of definition." Sanning
v. City of Cincinnati, 81 Ohio St 142, 90 N. E. 125, 127 (1909). Mr. Justice Holmes had
this to say: "We have few scientifically certain criteria of legislation, and as it often is
difficult to mark the line where what is called the police power of the States is limited
by the Constitution..., judges should be slow to read into the latter a nolulnus nmutare
as against the law-making power." Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110 (1911).
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-of the lives, health, and property of the citizens, and to the. preservation
of good order and public morals." 13
A more explicit statement of the point is in Cook Couanty v. City of
Chicago;14 "Among the powers exercised by municipalities are what are
known as the police powers of the state. These powers rest in the state, and
may be delegated to municipal corporations created by the state, to be
exercised for the welfare, saftey, and the health of the public. Under the
police power cities and villages may enact reasonable ordinances to preserve
health ... The police power is not impaired by the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . , but every citizen holds -his property subject to the proper exercise of
the police power, either by the state Legislature or by the public or municipal
corporations, to which the Legislature has delegated that power." A5
The Wisconsin court in the principal case grants these propositions.
"Nothing in this opinion is to be taken as in any way casting doubt upon
the power of the legislature to vest in a county board or municipal council
power to provide for the good order of the community by enacting ordinances
regulating local affairs, provided there is not included the power in either
to create crimes and impose criminal punishments." 16
The conclusion is that the legislature, without question, can delegate
part of its power to municipalities. This delegable power includes the police
power which is, in fact, very extensively exercised.
VIOLATIONs oF POLICE REGULATIONS AS CRIMES
The: principal case admits the power to permit the municipal authorities
to make police, regulations but denies the right to create crimes or impose
criminal punishments. The language used is interesting in raising the question
of what kind of "punishments"- are not criminal. This point will be discussed
later. The point at issue here is, when given the power to enact local police
regulations, what sanctions may be imposed to insure compliance with them.
Very suggestively, an earlier Wisconsin court had said that, "We know of
no better or more effective way of suppressing a disorderly house, or pre-
venting or crushing them out, than to provide a penalty against the keeper." 17
Can the violation of a police regulation be a crime? This poses the further
question which must be answered first of all, "What is a crime?"
"A crime is any wrong which the government deems injurious to the
13. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 33 (1877).
14. 311 111. 234, 142 N. E. 512 (1924).
15. Id at 512, 513. See also Baker City Mut. Irr. Co. v. Baker City, 58 Ore. 306,
113 Pac. 9 (1911); Tugman v. The City of Chicago, 78 Ill. 405 (1875); Commonwealth
v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27 (1871) ; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 At. 581 (1909) ;
Burckholter v. The Incorporated Village of McConnellsville, 20 Ohio St. 308 (1870) ;
City of Danville v. Hatcher, 101 Va. 523, 44 S. E. 723 (1903).
16. 28 N. W. 2d 345, 349.
17. Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568, 570 (1901).
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public at large, and punishes through a judicial proceeding in its own
name.... Ordinarily a cause is not deemed criminal if the State is not the
plaintiff." ' Such a definition would make a crime of almost any breach of
a regulation, thus a further analysis must be made.
A "true crime" is one of the products of the matured common law. As
the law came of age, "the rule was that there could be no conviction for
the commission of a crime without criminal intent on the part of the
offender." '- Every true crime has two parts; the physical element-the actus
remv,-and the mental element-the mens rea.20 But the ordinary regulatory
enactment simply declares the wrong to be the act itself-going more than
thirty-five miles per hour-and no use is made of the magic words "wilfully,"
"maliciously," or the like which would indicate the traditional mark of
criminal intent. So" we have a tremendous fidld of offenses that have none
of the ancient requirement of the guilty mind. They have been variously
called "public welfare offenses," 21 "public torts," 22 "police offenses," 23
and "regulatory offenses." 24
These types of offenses are of relatively recent appearance.2 5 They
are due to the expanding complexity of our society in which "the legislatures
found it necessary to increase tremendously the amount of regulatory enact-
18. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 32 (9th ed. 1923).
19. Comment: Unburdening the Substantive Criminal Law in Wisconsin, Wis. L.
REv. [19461 172, 173.
20. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 Haav. L. REv. 905 (1939).
21. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoL. L. Rav. 55 (1933). "The term 'public
welfare offenses,' is used to denote the group of police offenses and criminal nuisances,
punishable irrespective of the actor's state of mind, which have been developing in Eng-
land and America within the past three-quarters of a century." Id. at 56, n. 5.
22. BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES UPON CRImI;AL LAW,
129 (4th ed. 1928). Hall fails to see any significance in Beale's use of the term in con-
nection with the cases he cites. Hall, Inter-relations of Criminal Law and Torts: II,
43 CoL. L. REV. 967, 994 (1943) ; Note, Public Torts and Mens Rea, 12 IoWA L. REV. 407
(1927) at 408 states, "The term 'public torts' refers to injuries to the state which are
treated as analogous to civil injuries but which are actionable criminally either at common
law or by statute." Also Note, Public Torts, 35 H~av. L. REv. 462 (1922). Also MAY,
LAW OF CaI Es § 10 (4th ed. 1938). "Recently there has been advocated a new classifica-
tion of criminal offenses into public torts and real crimes. Public torts would' include all
wrongs against the state actionable criminally, the penalities for which are not intended
as punishment but as compensation ...they would include injuries to public property,
public nuisances, and police offenses."
23. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 21-22 (1904). "The peculiar province of the criminal
law is the punishment of acts intrinsically vicious, evil, and condemned by social sentiment;
the province of the police power is the enforcement of merely conventional restraints, so
that in the absence of positive legislative action, there would be no possible offense...
It has been the common practice of legislation to punish police offenses as misdemeanors,
i.e., by fine or commitment to the jail." Also Freund, Classification and Definition of
Crimes, 5 J. oF Camn. L. & CRin. 807 (1915). "Police offenses are both in legislation and
administration often distinguished from common crimes. Either the interest affected or
the guilt involved, or both, are less serious or urgent. The power or even policy of
repression is to a considerable degree delegated to local authorities." Id. at 824.
24. Note, Reclassification of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Crintinal, 12 Wis.
L. Rav. 365 (1937).
25. Their history is traced in Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. Rav. 55
(1933).
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merits; and for some reason the lawmakers turned to the criminal law for
sanctions." 26
These offenses defy analysis in terms of the criminal law 'and their
-effect on the criminal law has been bitterly attacked. They have become so
numerous in the statute books that to the layman the -term "criminal" is
beginning to lose its reprehensible character. That there is sound argument
that violations of police regulations should not be classified as crimes is
undeniable. The stumbling block 'seems to be the current, conceptions of
penology.27. To the average layman, the most effe.ctive sanction is imprison-
ment. If a material change, is made at this point, it .may well be possible to
make many. of the viplations of these police regulations mere civil offenses
punishable by a pecuniary penalty.
This is not to be taken to -mean that all of these public welfare offenses
are not true crimes. Four rules .we re set forth28 by Dean Gausewitz of the
College of Law of the University of New Mexico that .indicate a possible
,line of demarcation:
I.. No act which imposes absolute liability should .-remain criminal.
II. If the only penalty imposed for a present crime .is a. fine, the act
should be removed. from the criminal code, for the. penalty can as well be
imposed by civil action.
III. If a present crime was not a crime at common law, if its commission
does not prima facie indicate a dangerous personality, and if the act is not
popularly regarded as reprehensible, the act should be removed from the
criminal code.
IV. If .the act is of a.type that requ.ires the interest and expertness of
.a specially designated and qualified official for its efficient, enforcement, it
should not be a crime unless it clearly does not come within, class III.
The conclusions suggested are that violations of police regulations are
26. Comment, Unburdening the Substantive Criminal Law in Wisconsin, Wis L. Rsv.
[1946], 172, 175. The writer then continues, "This does not, of course, include the numerois
local ordinances and by-laws adopted by counties, cities, villages, and towns.... [in Wis-
-consin, because of the specific definition of a criminal proceeding] . . . In many states,
h6wever, such, violations are treated as crimes, and dealt with as such." Wis. STAT.
§ 260.05 (1945) states that "A criminal action is prosecuted by the state against a person
-chirged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof. Every other is a civil action."
Wis. CoNsT: ART. VII, § 17 declares that "all criminal prosecutions, shall be carried on in
the name and by the authority of the [State]." These two sections would give the basis
-for a less questionable opinion in the principal case by making the inability of municipali-
ties to create crimes peculiar to states which have such constitutional provisions and even
then iot necessarily so if machinery is established by the state to prosecute 0olations of
stich ordinances. It appears that in Minnesota, there are such provisions'in the city char-
-ters and the state is recognized as only a nominal party. State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 128,
52 N. W. 531 (1892) ; See also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55, 67-70
(1933).
27. See ELLIOTT, CONFLICTING PENAL THaEORIES Ix STATUTORY CRIx iIXAL LXW C.
11 (1931).
28. Note, Reclassification of Certain Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminiil, 12 Wis.
I,. REv. 365, 367 (1937).
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in the criminal codes as criminal offenses; that there is a powerful thco-
retical basis for removing them from the criminal codes but that until this.
is done the violators of such police regulations are subject to crimitial sanc-
tions and should be protected always by the established safeguards of
criminal pr'ocedure..
JUSTIFICATION OF litPRISONMENT AS A PROPER PENALTY IN A CIVIL ACTION:
FOR THE VIOLATION OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE - -' '
The prevailing view appears very clearly to be that the proceedings oni
the violation of municipal ordinances are civil actions for the recovery of
a debt.2 The most explicit authority, so far as advancing a reason for this.
stand, is Blackstone. 0 "... [E]very person is bound and hati virtually
agreed to pay such particular sums of Mnoney as are charged on hiri" by the
sentence, or assessed by the interpretation of the law. For it i a'part of
the original contract, entered into by all mankind Who partake tKe benefits"
of society, to submit in all points to the municipal constituti6nq' and locall
ordinances' of that state, of which each individual is a member. Wbatever,.
therefor8, 'the law orders anyone to pay, that becomes instan ly a debt,
which" he hath beforehand contracted to discharge." (Italics added)
It seems difficult to conceive that a part of our modern law shouldi
still be based upon the social contract theories of the Eighteenth Century.
Yt the courts do say that at common' laNV the proper action in Uhehe cases.
is in debt -of Assumpsit.3' A more moderi View82 suggests the means for a.
complete break with this approach by examining the sanction ifiended,rather
than the procedure imposed by historical accident. This' modein i st for-
determining: vhetlier' an action is civil or criininal by an examiiat6n of the
intent bf the lhislature in imposing the sanction will be considred later
in this c6rntiint. At this point, the matter of importance is the 'JustiAcation,
of.imprisonmefit in an alleged civil action for the violation of a- muicipal
ordinance. . "
" It is inteesting f6 iibte 'thlat in-1596 one Clark 'recovered a 'jtgment
against the mayor of a town for being falsely imprisoned. Clark' had -efused:
.to pay a'ta- assessed by' the town and in'punishment had been 'p tt in jail.
The court held that the violation bf a municipal by-law could not be 'Punished'
by imprisonment contrary. to the twent)-ninth chapter of the Magna Carta,3 31
29. 3 MCQUMLAN, MUNICIAL CoRoRAT1Ns § 1136 (2d ed., 1943 Revision); City of
Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 213 N. W. 335 (1927) ; O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120'
Tenn. 448, 111 S. W. 449 (1908).
30. 3 Comm. *158.
31. Ewbanks v. Town of Ashley, 36 Ill. 177 (1864) ; Coates v. Mayor of New York,.
7 Cow. 585 (N. Y. 1827).
32. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391 (1938).
33. "Nidlus liber hoino capiatur, vel inmprisonetur . . . . Nisi per legate judicimti
parium suorun, vel per legem terrae."
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which forbade the imprisonment of any free man except:by the judgment
of his peers or according to the law .of the .land, The court further said
that theto.wn- "might have inflicted a -rsonable penalty, but -not imprison-
ment, which penalty they might limit to- be levied- by distress,, or for.- which
an actipq of.,.ebt lay." 34
Imprisonment may be imposed,.a.ttwp .points. -First, to coerce the pay-
ment of a fine already levied for. violation .of the ordinance, .and second,
a4 the, sol.peenalty (or in addition to. a fine).- for the violation :of the ordi-
nance. Tle..basic question to be borne jn..!mind is that if this proceeding is
a civil actjpq for debt, how is the constitutional provision against imprison-
ment for debt explained away?
The.Wisconsin court in the instant case is in accord with.the, general
view that imprisonment is proper . coerce the payment of a fine35 and
by so holding must be implicitly denying the. contract propounded. by the
theory 'of Blackstone. The rationale for the coercion of a fine by imprison-
ment has b'een stated many times and now seems accepted beyopd question:
An Illinois court ^6 simply said, "The prohibition does extend'to'actions
for torts, nor td fines oi penalties' arising' from a volation of 'the penal laws
of the state. It has reference to debts arising e-v con.tfachi."' A Nebraska
,court37 te -to if' as "merely "a means of cbmpelling 6dheience -o'thie
judgment" of: the cotirt:"
AK'feder'air coitft8 8 gave a -very" reasonable6 'combinatiori df these two
-views of Why-imprisofment wiv ndt prohibited in these cas'es. "It may be
-admitted that' a penalty Wgiven 'by a statiite Is :technically a debt It does
-not, howtvei-, arise 'tipon contifat, but by oleriation of "law.'It i' iniposed
-as a quasi' pfinishineritfor ttie Vi'olation"of li oi' the hegl;!6 o" ireusal to
perform 'some duty 'to thepublic or i'ndividuals enjoined by la*. Penalties
:are hposdin'furth'erfiaiie of iome public police, -and as Ia meis "of securing
obedieii&e f6 -law. Persons vhc; incur"them are 'either in moras or law,
-wrongldbrs, 'nd ndt "inipfy unfortunate 'debtors unable'to perform their
pecuniary "obligatioiis." ' ." - " ' -"
Al'-)un&ary-penali seems obviously the proper forfeituredin this sort
.of 'case aid' if by judicial decision'it is not within the pale of the forbidden
contrdctull-debts, imprisonment'is p~rmissible to -coerce the p.Yment- of
34. Clark's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 64a, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (1596).
35. Supra note 1, 28 N. W. 2d 345, 349.
36. Kennedy v. People, 122 Ill: 649, 13 N. E. 213, 214 (1887); accord, Bray v. State,
140 Alai 172,37 So-250 (1904).: .. - .
37:'.Peterson v. State, 79 Nebr. 132, 112 N. W..306, 310 (1907). In Bregguglia v. Lord,
53 N. J. L. 168, 20 Atl. 1082 (1890) it was held that although the mayorhad power to
fine, imprison, or both, nevertheless, he did not have power to coerce the fine by imprison-
'nent unless that power was expressly given. Accord, Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51' Ga.
-639 (1874). Contra: City. -of Milwaukee v.. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 213 N. W -335 (1927).
(semble, there is an inherent power to coerce a fine validly imposed -by imprisonment).
38. United States v. Walsh, 28 Fed. Cas. 391, 393-4, No. 16;635 (D. Ore..1867):.
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such a penalty. The truly fundamental question is, however, by what reason-
ing can it be justifiable to imprison a man as the sole punishment for the
violation of a municipal ordinance? Imprisonment alone may only be imposed
if expressly authorized by the state in a grant of power to the municipality,P
and it is as a matter of fact extensively granted,'but how can it be authorized
as proper in an action on this civic debt?
An early Indiana court 40 declared the legislative intent to be "to require
payment by the labor of the defendant . . . " It is sufficient to point out
that the common law actions of debt and assumpsit lay for money only.41
It does not seem to be a question of justifying the use of imprisonment,
but of simply showing that there are no constitutional barriers to its use.
First of all, the usual constitutional provisions against imprisonment
for debt either expressly or by judicial decision exclude these technicar
debts. For example, Art. 1, Sec. 16 of the Wisconsin constitution forbids
imprisonment "for debt arising out of or founided upon a contract, expressed
or implied."
Secondly, constitutional provisions against slavery or involuntary servi-
tude do not prohibit imprisonment alone. "Imprisonment is not servitude.
Labor eriforced as a punishment is 'involuntary servitude.'" 42 The use by the
Wisconsin court of this type of provision 43 to invalidate imprisonment alone
as punishment for the violation of a municipal ordinance seems erroneous.
Unless, then, there is some other constitutional provision barring
imprisonment except upon conviction for a crime, this is generally regarded
as a permissible penalty. Admittedly this carries no weight as an argument
and is hardly persuasive in supporting a contention that there is a primary
intent to collect a debt. At the same time the courts are usually careful to
avoid giving anyr expression to the punitive and supposed deterrent aspects
of the imprisonment. There being little debate then, imprisonment continues
as a proper civil penalty with such results as may now be considered.
The conclusion to be drawn at this point is that there does not appear
to be any rationale for imprisonment as a civil penalty and at the same .tinie,
there does not seem to be any constitutional objection to its use. If the
thought does arise that after all a man may be sent to jail without a trial
by jury, the only answer is that these are civil actions and the personal
liberties are not there the primary concern.
39. The City of Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Ia. 59 (1864) ; City of Bozeman v. Merrell,
81 Mont. 19, 261 Pac. 876 (1927) ; 2 MCQUILLAX, MUNICIPAL CORPORATrONS § 752 (2d
ed. 1939 Revision).
40. Flora v. Sachs, 64 Ind. 155, 160 (1878).
41. 3 Br. CoMm. *154, *158,
42. Flannagan v. Jepson, 177 Iowa 393, 158 N. W. 641, 642 (1916). See Ex Partc
Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 429 (1885).
43. Supra note 1, 28 N. W. 2d 345, 348.
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CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS,
The results that flow from being able to imprison a man in a proceeding
for the violation of a municipal ordinance present an interesting problem.
By some means or other, the great majority of the courts have declared
that such proceedings are civil. When a Tennessee statue made it a misde-
meanor to violate a particular ordinance, the court felt impelled to say that
"the word 'misdemeanor,' as employed in statutes conferring power upon
municipal corporations, is not wholly synonymous with the same term as
used at common law, or in general statutes defining offenses against the
State of a grade less than felony, but has a more restricted meaning, being
limited to offenses against the smaller local government." 44 The "punish-
ment is in the form of the assessment of a penalty.45 . . . but at last the
purpose of the action is punishment." 46 Such candor should lead to a reali-
zation that the personal liberties were at stake and that the rules of criminal
procedure should govern. In the Tennessee case, the prisoner was told that
the city quite properly had an appeal, that his release on habeas corpus
was reversed; he was remanded to the custody of the jailer, and ordered
to pay the costs of the appeal.
In a Minnesota case,47 because violation of an or'dinance is only a
civil offense,-the accused had no right to a jury trial, proof beyond a reason-
able doubt was not' needed for a conviction, and statutes which r~fused the
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice or which refused the .defendant's
confession without evidence that the offense charged had been committed,
did not. apply to her case.
A number of similar results lends much weight to the assertion of one
writer that considering the proceeding on the violation of a municipal
ordinance as a civil action "has proved a particularly handy theory in that
it offers a convient subterfuge by which to evade the constitutional- rights
of persons accused of crime." 48 A person accused of violating an ordinance
may be punished and have no right to a trial by jury49 and in.:many cases,
if the state had tried- him for the same acts he would have had such a right.
It seems settled now that if by express grant from the legislature a city
makes a. prohibition by ordinance which is also a crime by state statute,
conviction for violation of the ordinance does not bar prosecution for the
44. O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 456, 111 S. W. 449, 450- (1908).
45. Id. at 459.
46. Id. at 460.
47. State v. Nelson, 157 Minn. 506, 196 N. W. 279 (1923). See City of Cape Girardeau
v. Smith, 61 S. W. 2d 231 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1933) (Rules of evidence in civil cases
govern prosecutions for ordinance violations).
48. Grant, Penal Ordinances ih; California, 24 CALIF. L. Rav. 123 (1936).
49. Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405, 14 S. E. 564 (1892) ; Ogden v. City of Madison,
111 Wis. 413, 87 N..W. 568 (1901); Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So.
398 (1894) (these offenses "are generally trivial in character." $500 fine); City of
Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N. W. 305 (1886).
VANDERBILT LAW-REVIEW
same offense as a state crime.50 The Lanza.- case settled, the law that the
same. acts. may. be. punished by. separate jurisd~ctions, as. stateand federal,
without double jeopardy attaching. But .,Municipality is the. :,qture of.
the state, and :as .such can punish, only what the state permit.it tqpunish.62
The argument that there gre two jurisdictions simply is not true; if only,
one jurisdiction, the accpsed is being punished twice for the same acts, once.
criminally, and, once civilly with criminal sanctions..
The matter cannot be discussed rationally on the level of a civil action
for debt. All, parties acknowledge that the plain intent is to punish. This
returns such proceedings, squarely to the criminal law. The cors "...re-
gard any proceedings as 'criminal' which may terminate in the-infliction of
punishment; .efven thougl~ it be merely a pecuniary. fine."'P, "[I.If the ,legis-
lature considers the act sufficently dangerous, to the state to yequirp punish-
ment, it is. a..crime." 4 :And the. test of punishment is found, "wheraeyer
imprisonmenat is prescribed or permitted,. 5
It is submitted that wvhen a violation of a municipal ordinance Fan be.
punished by- imprisonment.alone, that .that public 9ffense is, being..declared
a crime, and that all the safeguards of constitutional law s.hud, attach.
The Wisconsin court.in the Schniiege case stat.ed that a .Municipal, ordinance
cannot create. a. crime, and therefore that any imprisoqment-for:thc violation
-of such an ordinance -is unatthorized. It has been indicated previously
that municipalities clearly have the right to declare as crimes violations
of their police regulations. That such, violations became debts by mere
historical accident has resulted in inadequate protection for de.fendants in
such cases.
I The point at which the. courts were forced to make their major stand
as to .whet.her' the prosecutions were. civil or criminal came when the de-
fendant was acquitted and the municipality wished to appeal.6, The decisions
cannot be reconciled, but are most instructive when the various attempts
at rationalization are examined. The trouble stems, from the b.sic premises.
The courts recognized that the law was established that these were civil
50. Greenwood v. The State, 6 Baxt. 567 (Tenn. 1873) State ex rel Karr v. Taxing
District of Shelby, County, 16 Lea 240 (Tenn. 1886); Hood v. Von Glahn, 88 Ga. 405,
14 S. E. 564 (1892); Ogden v. City of Madison, 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568 (1901).
Contra: Village of Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N. W. 1068 (1889) (a vigorous
dissent to the very concept).51. United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922). See Grant, The LanIa Rule of
Successive Prosecutions, 32 COL. L. REv. 1309 (1932).
52. See Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal Ordinance as Double
Jeopardy, 16 CoRN. L. Q. 201 (1931).
53. KENNY, OuTLN.Es oF CRmiNAL LAW 19 (15th ed. 1946):
54. Note, Public Torts, 35 HARv. L. Rm. 462 (1922).
55. Id. at 463. "The mere term 'fine' or 'punished by fine' in a penal statute does not
necessarily imply a misdemeanor. It is otherwise'as to the terms 'fine and imprisonment'
and 'fine or imprisonment'." City of Milwaukee v. Ruplinger, 155 Wis. 391, 145 N. W.
42, 43 (1914).
56. See Note, 116 A. L. R. 120 (1938).
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actions, .but it was also undeniable that the proceedings were usually criminal
in form and led to sanctions that were peculiarly criminal and punitive. The
language. difficulties are intriguing, however regrettable the results may
frequently appear to be.
A Tennessee court 67 saidi "A municipality is a government within it-
self, and xhust have the power to punish for offenses against its laws, and
must be able'to bring that punishment to bear and to-make it effective by its
own agencies, that is, through its own courts and officers. However, the right
of apeal hay be given, and generally'is given, and, if exercised,, the munic-
ipality appears in another jurisdiction; that is, in th6 courts of the'State, as
a suitor to recover the penalty which it has assessed against the violator of
its laws. But ihe larger court, while trying the controversy as a: civil suit, will
see to it that the municipality, if successful,' shall have the same-sanctions for
the- enforcement of its laws as if the trial had terminated in the municipal
court. In truth, the action is in'itis various aspects a hybrid one, partly criminal
and partly civil."
The Missotiri courts had some verbal difficulties, as shown by the fol-
lowing "A' proceeding in the name of a city to recover a penalty for the
breach'6f an ordinance is a criminal one from some points of view . but
it is also a civil proceeding from other viewpoints. The best the law has been
able to do is to call it civil or quasi criminal in character." 68
The same court seyeral . years later, when faced with the same type of
violation, said, "We have differently defined the suit as civil or quasi civil." 59
A difference over the meaning of "quasi criminal" is seen in a series of
Wisconsin cases...'
lP'resident of the Village of Platteville v. McKernan 60 simply states "that
where a city or village ordinance, prohibits that which is a crime ,Pr misde-
meanor,.4n4 punishable at common law or by statute, and prescribes a penalty
for its violation by a fine, and,. conditionally, imprisonment, the action to
recover such penalty is quasi criminal, and cannot be brought to this court
by appeal on behalf of. the plaintiff."
In Ogden v. City of Madison, 61 the court denied that the violation of a
57. O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 460-461, 111 S. W. 449 f1908).
58. City of St. Louis v. Ameln, 235 Mo. 669, 139 S. W. 429, 431 ('1911)'. Other cases
in which "quasi criminal" means civil are: State v. Rouch, 47 Ohio St. 478 25 N. E. 29
(1890) ; Davis v. City of Guntersville, 27 Ala. App. 208i 169 So. 222 (1936).-
59. City of St. Louis v. Bender, 248 Mo. 113, 154 S. W. 88, 89 (191a). Two other
Missouri examples: "a civil action" in City of St. Louis v. Stubley, 154* S. W. 2d 407,
410 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1941) ; "in' its nature a civil action" in City of St.-Louis, v. Fitch,
353 Mo. 706, 183 S. W. 2d 828 (1944). -' 1 .
60. 54.Wis. 487, 11 N. W. 798, 799 (1882). "Quasi- riminal" appears to mean crimi-
nal in, State v. Brown, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N. W. 531 (1892) ; Bray v. State, 140 Ala. 172,
37 So. 250 (1904),
61. 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568, 573 (1901).
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city ordinance "arose to the grade of a misdetnearior for no other reason than
that it was also forbidden by the state laW."
• The decision in City of Miliwaukee '%. Johnsonl 62 that "all proceedings
to collect penalties under municipal ordinances shall be treated as civil ac-
tions, . .-." was, therefore, not unexpected, in that "the nature of the relief
sought, and not the possibility that sbme-other proceeding may be brought...
should be the test by which to determine whether the proceeding under the
ordinance is civil or quasi criminal in its nature." 6 The ordinance in this
case prohibited the owning or operating of a slot machine and the Penalty
for violation was fine, imprisonment, or both.
The Wisconsin statute 64 says that "A criminal action is prosecuted by
the state against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment
thereof. Every other is a civil action."
In City of Waukesha v. Sch essler,65 the city claimed that the. violation
of a city ordinance resulted in a quasi criminal proceeding and therefore that
the defendant's manner of appeal was erroneous. The court settled the matter
with definite finality. "By no process of reasoning, nor any.subterfuge, can
there be created a third class of actions, nor can any action except one prose-
cuted by the state be considered a criminal action." This is a wholly admirable
solution and should clarify many matters if adopted more widely.
All jurisdictions have not remained adamant on these questions. Many
courts have reacted vigorously to the view that such proceedings are civil
and have flatly declared them to be criminal. The reasoning is varied. Most
frequently it is asserted that the character of the proceedings precludes any
other view than that they are designedly criminal. 66 Whatever is done in the
way of enforcement of ordinances is by permission of the state and in West
Virginia that is criminal which "is a violation of any law or ordinance of man
subjecting the offender to public punishment, including fine or imprisonment,
and excluding redress for private injury, punitive or compensatory." 67
"The terms 'crime,' 'offense,' and 'criminal offense' are all "ynonymous,
and ordinarily used interchangeably, and include any breach of law estab-
lished for the protection of the public .... A municipal ordinance is as much
a law fo the protection of the public as is a criminal statute of the
state .... ,, 68 A strong factor in this matter is whether or not the ordinance
62. 192 Wis. 585, 213 N. W. 335, 338 (1927).
63. Id. at 337.
64. Wis. StAT. § 260.05 (1945).
65. 239 Wis. 82, 300 N. V. 498 (1941).
66. City of Portland v. Erickson, 39 Ore. 1, 62 Pac. 753 (1900).
67. City of Charleston v. Belier, 45 W. Va. 44, 30 S. E. 152 (1898).
68. State ex rel. Erickson v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N. W. 845, 847 (1889). Sec.
610.01 ('MINN. StArs. ANN. 1947) states that "A crime is an act or omission forbidden
by law, and punishable upon conviction by death, imprisonment, fine, or other penal dis-
cipline.... Every crime punishable by fine not exceeding $100, or by imprisoninent in a
jail for not more than 90 days, is a misdemeanor."
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forbids an act which is declared a crime by state statute. If- it does, the vio-
lation of the ordinance is usually considered a crime,6 9 but, this is. clearly not
entirely, adequate. ,
Some courts make no effort to deny to the municipality the right to
create crimes under its .general delegated powers.O By specific, statute, the
city authorities may be given definite power to hold criminal pr.Koceedings.71
Most conclusively, a North Carolina statute simply says, "If any person, shall
violate an ordinance of a city or town, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding
thirty days." 72 The civic authorities, are given jurisdiction in these cases.73
The attempt has here been made to show the .effects of holding pro-
ceedings on the violation of municipal ordinances to be civil actions, Whether
the proceedings be civil or, criminal, the defendant is being subjected to the
criminal sanctions of imprisonment or fine and imprisonment. .In any pro-
ceeding in which the accused is faced with the possibility of being subjeg-ted
to these sanctions, it is submitted that he. ought to be protected by the safe-
guards. of the criminal procedure. His guilt should be established by evidence
showing it beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a mere preponderance of
the evidence. His right to a trial by jury should be set by the requirements in
criminal cases in the particular jurisdiction. If the state constitution makes
the right to'a trial by jury absolute in all criminal cases; anyone about to be
subjected 'to criminal sanctions shotild'have an absolute right to'the benefit of
this provision.
If, under certain circumstances, the state is allo'ied an appeal-in criminal
eases, the limitatiois on the state should attach in'the same 'fashion to the
iunicipality's right 6f appeal in th'ese cases. ". . "
The courts seemed to have recoguized some of these rights and in the
attempt to reconcile the issues, were forced into the verbal arid logical dis-
crepancies indicated above. The basic premise whici" made ci prbceedings
on the violation of municipal ordinances civil actions is too broad tolie upheld
with justice. Legislation will probably be necessary to attach these.safeguards
firmly to the accused in these cases. The suggestion is here made to re-ekamine
the problem in terms of what is intended by the particular police regulation
and what is intended by the sanction imposed for its violatipn.
69.. See Note, 33 L. R. A. 33 (1896).
70. Kohr Bros. v. Atlantic City, 104, N. J. L. 468, 142 At. 34 (1928); Bi'ra v. State,
140 Ala. 172, 37 So. 250 (1904) ; City of Seattle v. Bell, 199 Wash. 441, 92' P.- 2d 197
(1939).
71. City of Greenville v. Pridmore, 162 S. C. 52, 160 S. E. 144 (1931) ; Hayes v.
City of Jasper, 26 Ala. App. 401, 160 So. 775 (1935).
72. GEN. STAT. N. C. § 14-4 (1943).
73. GEN. STAT. N. C. § 160-13 (1943).
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THE TEST OF INTENT AS TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED
As previously indicated, an attempt to consider a proceeding for the"
violation of a municipal ordinance as a civil action for debt creates difficulties
in its rationale. One of the difficulties is verbal. The common expression used
by the courts is that a civil action is begun to collect a penalty, whereas a
criminal action exacts a punishment. Suppose the punishment in a criminal
action is a fine of a sum of money. A New York court tried to make a dis-
tincti6n between a "fine" and a "penalty" 74 "'Penalty' is a generic term,
which includes fines as well as other kinds of punishment.... Strictly speak-
ing, 'penalty' denotes punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed
and enforced by the state for a crime against its laws .... As generally under-
stood in this state, . . . a fine is imposed in a criminal action or proceeding,
but a penalty or forfeiture ordinarily is recoverable in a civil action." This
quotation does indicate the difficulty, for according to common parlance, all
punishments are penalties, but not all penalties are punishments. The trouble
is that to determine which is which the courts have, according to justice
Brandeis, "usually attempted to distinguish between the type of procedural
rule involved rather than the kind of sanction being enforced." 75 Thus it is
first determined that proceedings on the violation of a municipal ordinance
are civil actions and, therefore, it follows that only penalities ensue. It is
submitted that a better approach is by way of distinguishing a remedial from
a punitive sanction. This goes to the intent of the legislature in imposing the
sanctior. A suggestive method of handling this distinction was made by
justice Brandeis in Hclvering v. Mitchell.7
6
Mitchell was acquitted of a criminal charge of wilfully evading the in-
come tax laws in the amount of $728,709. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue then assessed the deficiency of $728,709 and added to it the statutory
penalty of 50%, or $364,354, for fraud with intent to evade the tax. The
court of appeals approved the deficiency assessed but denied the right to assess
the penalty because it was clearly a punishment and not a preventive
measure. 77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the penalty assessment
issue. justice Brandeis upheld the penalty assessment and reasoned,
1. Mitchell's acquittal could not be res judicata because of differences
of proof required in criminal and civil cases. A civil suit, "remedial
in nature" is not barred by a prior criminal acquittal. "Where the
objective of the subsequent action likewise is punishment, the ac-
quittal is a bar." 78 Mitchell naturally contended that this was "a
74. City of Buffalo v. Neubeck, 209 App. Div. 386, 204 N. Y. Supp. 737, 738-9 (1924).
75. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 400 (1938).
76. Ibid.
77. Mitchell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 89 F. 2d 873 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
78. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 398 (1938).
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criminal penalty intended as punishment for allegedly fraudulent
acts," and therefore that the proceeding was criminal.
2. This sanction was remedl. The provisi6n of a civil procedure for
collection of this penalty is evidence of that intent; the provision in
another section. for a distinctly punitive sanction points to this as a
remedial sanction.- The whole objective of such sanctions is to act
"primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to
reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation
and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud.".
79
In a footnote, Justice Brandeis added that "The fact. that ,a criminal
procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of a sanction may be an iridica-
tion that it is intended to be punitive, but cannot be deemed conclusive if al-
ternative enforcement by a civil proceeding is sustained." so
In the light of the issues that may arise, the wisdom is apparent of writ-
ing the statute in such a way as clearly to indicate the objective. in mind. A
New York statute 8 1 gives the alternative of a punishment of a fine ($150),
imprisonment, or both; "br" such ordinance may provide for a penalty, not
exceeding five hundred doilars to 'be recovered by the city in a civil action.';
CoNCLUSION
In summary,, it is submitted that violations of municipal ordinances can
be and frequently are crimes; that any distinction should be based upon the
intent of the sanction imposed; that if any intent to punish is evident, vhich
intent is bet manifested by imprisonment, the safeguards of criminal pro-
cedure should be at the disposal of the accused. A re-examination of' the
rationale of penalizing for the violation of municipal ordinances is necessary
to the en1 that if a crime is being created, it should be clearly delineated, but
that if an act is being forbidden which the municipality intends to result in a
pecuniary penalty in the nature of civil damages, it may not be forced-to justify
its litigati6n by insupportable arguments based upon an obsolete philosophical
concept.
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79. Id. at 401.
80. Id. at 402.
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